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Introduction 
The research topic of boards of directors in companies in general and in startups 
particular has been addressed by several disciplines including, management, finance, 
and organisational behaviour (Durisin and Puzone, 2009).  
This developmental paper reviews and reflects upon selection of core corporate 
governance theoretical frameworks in the context of Venture Capital (VC) backed 
startups, specifically agency theory, resource-dependence theory, team production 
theory and emerging behavioural theory of boards. 
The findings will serve as an input into research design of a study into processes, 
working relationships and dynamics of startup boards. 
 
Background 
Traditionally, corporate governance studies have been concerned with board 
structures, demographics, board roles (inputs) and how these link to the overall 
performance of the firm (outputs) (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). Thus, 
majority of theoretical knowledge and policy recommendations built up over the 
evolution of corporate governance board literature seem to be constructed with little 
or no concern for what actually happens on boards, i.e. processes and associated with 
them behaviours in and around boardrooms (Pettigrew, 1992). Despite the long 
tradition, the mainstream research failed to produce consistent and unambiguous 
results (Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009). Recently, this led to a growing 
number of calls for studies of behaviours and inter-relationships of the board 
members (Huse, 1998, Forbes and Milliken, 1999, McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999, 
Huse, 2005, Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009, Durisin and Puzone, 2009). As 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) eloquently put it, in order to better understand boards, 
“we need to know more about the behaviour of those who sit on boards”. Behaviour 
has been defined in the literature as the ability of directors to carry out their 
responsibilities and tasks (Forbes and Milliken, 1999, Huse, 2005, van Ees et al, 2008, 
Voordeckers, 2014). 
VC-backed startups have “much more active boards” as opposed to boards of 
directors in traditional contexts such as large corporations. (Fried, Bruton and Hisrich 
1998, p.499). As a result of having active boards, VC-backed startups are perceived to 
achieve a “superior firm performance, increased value for investors and increased 
value for society” (Fried, Bruton and Hisrich, 1998, p.501). Consequently, boards of 
VC-backed startups represent a very rich context setting for researchers of corporate 
governance, especially in the wake of recent calls for qualitative studies of board 
dynamics, processes and working relationships of directors “to open up the black box 
of boards” (McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas, 2013, p.191). 
 
Review and reflections 
Agency theory is by far the most dominant theory used to study boards of directors 
(Durisin and Puzone, 2009; Huse and Rindova, 2001). The two key themes explored 
through the theoretical lens of agency theory on the subject of boards include the 
relationship between the composition of the firm’s board and the overall performance, 
with seminal works by Zahra and Pearce (1989), Pettigrew (1992), Johnson et al. 
(1996), and the relationship between the leadership structures and the overall 
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performance, explored by Rechner and Dalton (1991), Dalton et al. (1998) (Nicholson 
and Kiel, 2007; Durisin and Puzone, 2009).  
The conceptual and empirical body of knowledge of the agency theory has been 
extended to include VC-backed startup boards (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994, Arthurs 
and Busenitz, 2003, Zahra and Filatotchev 2004, Garg 2013). From the agency 
perspective, the key distinct feature of investor-backed startups is that there is no or 
little separation between control and ownership, where both new investor-owners 
(principals) and founders (agents) have equity stakes in the business (Sapienza and 
Gupta, 1994; Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003; Zahra and Filatotchev 2004; Garg 2013). 
To this point, Garg (2013) argued that although it may seem that the agency problem 
is somewhat reduced in investor-backed startups as managers are also shareholders, 
their interests may still be hugely misaligned, and therefore the agency problem 
would still exist.  
However, research and empirical works using agency to analyse investor-backed 
startup boards seem to simply verify the existence of agency relationship between 
new shareholders and owners and provide reasons for why VCs employ “more 
elaborate governance structures for monitoring and control” when aligning the 
interests of founders with their own (Daily et al., 2002, p.401).  Nevertheless, there is 
also evidence that startup boards are more active and add a huge value rather than 
merely monitor (Zhang, Baden-Fuller and Pool, 2001). Yet, agency as a theoretical 
perspective, appears to over-emphasize an input-output relationship between the 
characteristics and structure of the board and the overall performance of the firm, 
failing to shed any light on behaviours of board members, such as “dealing with the 
complexity and uncertainly associated with strategic decision making” (Van Ees, 
Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009, p. 2). Although agency theory has, over the years, been 
quite influential in regards to the development of national and international corporate 
governance policies and codes of director conduct, its assumptions in regards to 
conflicts of interest and its prescribed solutions, incentives in particular, have recently 
been seriously questioned for lack of insight since the latest economic crisis resulted 
in failure of major global financial institutions and corporations such as Lehman 
Brothers and Enron (Kaufman and Englander, 2005, Huse, 2008). It is therefore not 
surprising that over the past 10 years the corporate governance research has started 
focusing more on board behaviours and inter-relationships and their impact on 
processes and effectiveness of boards. 
 
Resource dependence theory is another prominent theory in corporate governance for 
researching boards of directors (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). The theory considers an 
organisation as open system influenced by the external environment and suggests that 
in order to understand its behaviour, one “must understand the context of that 
behaviour – that is, the ecology of the organisation” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p.1). 
In contrast to agency theory, which regards the board of directors as one of the 
solution mechanisms to the agency problem placing its monitoring function above all, 
resource dependence theory calls for the main function of the board to be a link to the 
external environment and a provision of important resources required to maximise the 
performance of the firm (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The theory 
argues that a company with a board that possesses a high number of links to the 
external environment and stakeholders, such as customers and suppliers, sources of 
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capital and market or other information, will have a better and faster access to those 
resources compared to its competitors (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).  
A number of researchers argue that resource dependence theory is particularly 
relevant as a theoretical lens when examining boards of early stage entrepreneurial 
firms, including investor-backed startups (Lynall, Golden and Hillman, 2003; Zahra 
and Filatotchev, 2004). During the initial stages of development, majority of startup 
businesses lack resources, including finance and human resources (Wasserman, 
2014). On their journey to minimize risk and resource dependence on the external 
environment, startups set up boards, attracting directors with skills and experiences 
that at the time are perceived to be of most importance for the growth of the business. 
Resource dependence theory seems to provide an explanation of how startup boards 
are formed and their role in the development of the business to quickly acquire a wide 
range of skills, expertise, customer contacts and capital (Zhang, Baden-Fuller and 
Pool, 2011). Using resource dependence as a theoretical lens it has even been 
established that attracting important and valuable resource can result in a significantly 
increased value of the startup, however the trade-off is to give up founder control 
either in a form of shareholding or a board seat (Wasserman 2014). 
However, similarly to agency theory, the resource based perspective has been 
criticised for a very narrow focus on just a “single aspect of a board’s role” 
(Nicholson and Kiel 2007, p. 601). In the context of entrepreneurial firms backed by 
VCs, the theory also seems to downplay a “potential for damaging appropriation of 
their resources” highlighting only a cooperative side of parties that act as linkages to 
the external environment (Katila, Rosenberger and Eisenhardt, 2008, p.31). Finally, 
over the recent years, it has also been argued that the predictive power of the theory 
has declined considerably and it requires some modification to reflect challenges and 
realities of the modern day (Davis and Cobb, 2009).  
 
The dominance of agency theory and resource dependence theory for researching 
boards in general and startup boards in particular, has been challenged by a “path-
breaking” team production theory developed originally by Blair and Stout (1999) 
(Pollman, 2015, p.619). Specifically, team production theory questions the basic 
underlying assumption of agency theory – the shareholder wealth maximisation. It 
argues that rather than protecting and maximising shareholder interests, the wealth of 
all stakeholders that “add value, assume unique risk, and possess strategic 
information” must be considered (Kaufman and Englander, 2005, p.9). Using the 
team production perspective, boards of directors are viewed as “value-adding teams 
on top of the corporate hierarchy” and their main role is to operate as a “mediating 
hierarchy that balances the sometimes conflicting interests of the many stakeholders 
who make up the firm” (Huse and Gabrielsson, 2012). Effectively, a team production 
model offers companies not only ‘tools’ for creating and managing a value adding 
board (Kaufman and Englander, 2005, p.20) but also a useful set of dimensions for 
researchers to explore the inner-workings of boards, such as board team cohesiveness, 
creativity, cognitive conflicts, openness, questioning attitude and commitment (Huse 
and Gabrielsson, 2012). Recent work by Pollman (2015) demonstrated that the 
mediating hierarchy model of team production theory is also reflected in the dynamics 
of startup boards. However, the main disadvantage of the theory and its concepts is 
that to date they lack systematic and empirical studies to effectively challenge the 
dominance of other corporate governance theories (Kaufman and Englander, 2005).  
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The emerging behavioural theory of boards and corporate governance has its roots in 
the ground-breaking work of Cyert and March (1963) on behavioural theory of the 
firm, employed to understand organisational decision-making (Van Ees, Gabrielsson 
and Huse, 2009). The behavioural theory of the firm challenges dominant economic 
assumptions that corporations exist to maximise profits, placing an emphasis on 
decision-making processes within the firm in order to predict behaviours in relation to 
corporate strategic choices (Cyert and March, 1963). More recently and in response to 
calls to better understand behaviours in and around boardrooms, several corporate 
governance researchers, Huse, Van Ees and Gabrielsson extended the behavioural 
theory of the firm into a behavioural framework and a research agenda to explain the 
role of board’s behaviours in the decision-making processes based on the four core 
behavioural theory’s constructs, namely satisficing, bounded rationality, routinisation 
and political bargaining, (Huse, 2005, Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009, Huse 
and Gabrielsson, 2012). This emerging behavioural theory of boards and corporate 
governance understands boards as open systems with multiple coalitions of 
stakeholders possessing varying weight and power and participating in complex 
processes of decision-making (Huse, 2005). Instead of maximising profits or other 
non-financial outcomes, the boards engage in satisficing or searching for solutions 
that are simply satisfactory and not necessarily optimal, owing to various limitations, 
otherwise defined as bounded rationality, existing in the moment of the decision-
making, such as incomplete information available at the time, specific set of 
circumstances or cognitive prejudices of the decision-makers (Van Ees, Gabrielsson 
and Huse, 2009, Hendry, 2005). The theory also recognises that board members rely 
on their knowledge, past experience and lessons, which they routinize and apply 
during decision-making thus creating environment of learning by doing and 
experimenting in the boardroom (Huse, 2007). Furthermore, boards, as coalitions of 
varied stakeholders with their own goals and interests, inevitably engage in political 
bargaining, not only during resolutions of conflicts but also during cooperation and 
decision-making (Gavetti et al, 212). On the whole, Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse 
(2009) argue that using this set of behavioural concepts as a theoretical lens to study 
board decision-making processes would enable corporate governance researchers to 
better understand conditions for effective corporate governance (Van Ees, 
Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009). Consequently, researchers could also construe how 
boards should be behaving and what they should be doing that would enable them to 
fulfil their responsibilities more effectively  (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
 
Critically, the behavioural theory of boards is still emerging and, apart from a few 
recent pioneering studies, for example by Voordeckers et al (2014) examining the 
relationship between board structures and actual board behaviours in SMEs in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, it remains empirically untested. To that end, 
one of the significant criticisms of the behavioural theory of firms and consequently 
the behavioural theory of boards has been that its theoretical concepts are very hard to 
test empirically as it would require data collection and gaining access beyond 
standard methods of surveys and interviews (Van Ees, Van der Laan and Postma, 
2008).  
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Further Development 
This review illustrates that agency and resource dependence theories have been 
somewhat useful in explaining forces that influence the formation of VC-backed 
boards and some of their key roles, such as monitoring and resource provision but 
they fail to shed light on actual board processes. Whilst team production theory does 
offer a set of dimensions to explore the inner-workings of boards, it has been found 
that some of its underlying assumptions cannot not be extended to all corporations 
(Pollman, 2015). The behavioural framework for boards and corporate governance on 
the other hand, although not yet much empirically tested, has been gaining 
momentum in the corporate governance research community. Over the past 10 years 
its concepts have been significantly developed in the literature into a new research 
agenda in response to calls for better understanding of inner workings of the board 
through studies of behaviours of those who sit on boards.  
This developmental paper contributes to the rationale for adopting the emerging 
behavioural framework as a theoretical lens in a following-on research study. 
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